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On the Syntax and Semantics of English Modals 
1. In approaching the problem of the semantics of utterances 
in natural languages, it seems natural to assume assertions 
or statements as the basic class of messages and to derive 
other classes from them, ?le then compare various types of 
CTessages with kinds of expreosions found in languages and take 
note of points where correlation is not syrunetric. We could 
alternatively begin with various forms of expression and 
study the nature of messages they convey. Finally, we can, 
as do Austinian philosophers, consider the use of words and 
note the differences between what is presupposed by the use of 
these words and mat they can be used to ass'ert, to order, to 
promise, ato accuse and so forth. A number of philosophers 
have tried to analyze the so-called happiness condition for 
the performance of certain kinds of linguistic utterances. A 
grammarian's job should be to figure out how illocutionar:,.' 
forces and happiness conditions can be related to certain 
lexical and syntactic properties of sentences. 
Within the tradition of Aristotelian logic, sentences are 
dichotomized into those to which there is truth value and 
those to which there is none. But the truth value test is 
far :from unambiguous. No truth value is assignable, for 
example, to (1) or (2): 
(1) He would have been killed 
(2) I ought to have read that yesterday 
All imperatives and interrogatives don't have truth Yalue, 
tho~gh answers to some questions, e.g. (3) or (4) 
(3) Vlho 1 s the author of Tropic of Cancer? 
(4) Are you ready yet? 
will have. An answer like 
(5) He might come tomorrow 
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represents a point on a scale of several possible answers·to 
the single question 
(6) Will he come tomorrow'? 
It seems clear that the truth value test cannot even begin to 
be used as a means to an interesting taxonomy of utterance 
types. 
Strawson and Searle have tried to explicato Austin's 
notion of illocutionary force in terms of Grice's theory of 
meaning. On Grice's account, a speaker S ~eans something by 
an utterance Y if and only ~fin uttering Y the speak~r S 
intends to achieve some effect in some hearer Hand that H 
recognize S's intention and that this recognition will function 
as li' s rea.son in a certain intended manner. Austin claims that 
there are ''third power of ten 1' illocutionary forces in English, 
~his is important to his conception of illocutionary acts. 
Illocutionary force5 may be more or less indeterminate. 
Suppose I ask you to do something for me. My utterance can 
be a request, an entreaty or a plea. One might think of 
illocutionary acts as on a continuum of specificity but this 
would not do justice of the full complexity of the speech 
acts. For under the rubric "illocut:i.onary force" are all 
sorts of different principles of distinctions: purposes of 
acts, relations between speaker and hearer, degrees of 
cof!l.!llitment and roles of acts, etc, Consider for a moment 
the relation between subject-person and illocutionary force 
by looking at so~e simple past statements in the third person, 
second person and first person: 
(7) John went to the hospital this morning 
(8) You went to the hospital this morning 
(9) I went to the hospital this morning 
Clearly (7) is most likely an assertion, with speaker's 
knowledge based on either direct observation or on reliable 
evidence. The claim for reliability in (9) is much stronger 
and normally should be beyond any shadow of doubt, (8) is 
not just an assertion; it is also likely to be an accusation. 
The speaker ia challenging the hearer to the contrary. It 
obviously cannot have the force of (7) and (9\ of teaching 
the listen.er something he did not know before. 
The present tense in,•olves the question of the shared 
knowledge of speaker and hearer. In 
(10) I know that he left 
11 I know" signals the trustworthiness of a statement made in 
the best evidential conditions, It functions like adverbs 
or parentheticals, that is, as if it said 
(11) He certainly left. 
(10) therefore corn.1:1.its the s·peaker to the truth of th.e etate-
ment he left. It can be cqntradicted by 
(lOa) No, you don't, because he did not leave 
(10b) Ee certainly left 1 but you did not know 
(lOc) You may have thought that he left, but you 
did not know 
Performatives, however, cannot be contradicted without 
creating a bizarre communication. I consider (13) and (15) 
as pathDlogical. 
(12) I promise you to do it 
(13) No, you don't 
(14) I order you to go 
(15) No, you don't. 
2. Hany sentences in the third person have quite different 
meanings from those in the first or the second, as indicated 
above. This is seen most clearly in modal sentences 1 with 
which this paper is centrally concerned. As discussed in 
logic, the notion of modality is first due to Aristotle 1 who 
argues for two basic modalities only--possibility and 
necessity (approximately and ~)--various other5 be~ng 
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reducible .to these two in one way or another. One thing that 
emerges clearly from Aristotle's discussion is that there 
are e5sential similarities among modal sentences and quanti-
fied sentences. If a sentence is necessary, it is true of 
all p~ssibilities; if a sentence is uossible, it is true of 
some nossibilities; if it is impossible, it is true of no 
nossibility (it is not true of any possibility). We may 
note further that the notion necessity may be related to 
obligation in the same sense as impossible is related to 
prohibi.tian. 
The English modals ~ and mav, capable of meaning either 
possibility or uermission, and must (and it negation), meaning 
either necessity or obligation (and imposiibility and prohi-
bition) ~oint up exactly these parallelismo. 
The following tripartition captures the above-~entioned 
similarities: 
A. all-some-none (quantified mode) 
B. 	 necessity-possibility-impossibility (alethic 
mode) 
C. command-permission-prohibition (denotic mode) 
Categories in C may further be thought of as results of adding 
to categories in Ban element of~ with regard to another 
person, implying that at leaet two persons are involved in' 
any sentences that belong in these categories. 
Aristotle was concerned with other implications, however. 
Re developed a theory of logical relations of sentences 
containing such modals, a topic which has been treated ever 
since, but does not concern us here. 1 
1 
-Interested readers are referred for more information on 
this topic to (to mention but one) I. M. Bochenski, Ancient 
Formal Logic, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 
1951. 
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'!'he term llodal is often applied to the closed set of 
auxiliaries in English consisting of .£.:!11 could, ~ay, ,?_is;h,t, 
must, will, would, shall, should, ought to and sometinles 
need (not) and dare (not). Other linguists also recognize 
have (got) to,, be to, be able to, had better, had/would 
2rather and one or two more. 
2Long (1961, p. 138) accepts have and be as true 
auxiliaries, but regards the modals as fullverbe capable of 
trucing 5entential objects. Joos {1964) admits the modals 
partly on the be.sis of their behavior with r~spect to do and 
partly on semantic ground15. Diver (1964) iAcludes ~and 
used to but excludes~ and~. 
Each of Aristotle's two basic modalities can be enriched 
in a number of int ereating ways to co.rreepond to diverse needa 
of human communication. Possibility, for instanoe, can range 
all the way from mere possibility to near inescapabilit~. 
Necessity may be attributed to such unrelated factors as laws 
of logical inference t to phys·ical laws, to human will, or to 
moral obligatio.n of all sorts. In fact, languages tend to 
treat logtcal necessity indistinguish~bly from physical conae-
q_uences or m.ora.1 obligation. Thus, in uttering 
(16) John ought to do it 
(17) You must open the window 
it is mo!'e often than not really inescapable that John or you 
do it. Indeed, with oui;,;.h.t, it is almost always the case that 
we fail to do it, a;nd in present or past tense, ou~ht in fact 
presupposes the falsity of predication. 
(18) John ought to be here by now 
(19) You ought to have been here this morning 
mean that John isn't here now and that you failed to show up 
thie morning. 
Theoretically, modalities must be combinable, since we 
can say such things as 
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(20) It must be the ease that he can do it 
( 21) It may turn out that John will have to go  
In Snglish, however, medals are mutua2.ly exclusive, at leaGt  
those that are :nos.t readily accepted as true modals. Thus  
(22) *must can 
(23) *dare {not) will 
(24) *must be to 
(25) •ought to must 
(26) •may oust, etc .. ,  
are never permitted.  
Let me quickly name scme of the major characteristics of 
English modals before going on to a somewhat more detailed 
examination of their syntax and semantics. The fir6t character-
istic of a modal is that under negation, the negative particle 
_!lot follow fl the :nodal; i!l. contrust, a non-modal verb, when 
negated, calls for £,£-support and the particle~ is then 
attached to the auxiliary do. The. follovdng are impossible 
.in Snglish: 
( ) •r like not John 
(28) *we saw not him 
Secondly, the 1nversion tra.~aformation obtains for 
medals under interrogation or after the negative preverbs 
such as ~~ , ~9~, n 1.: v er , ~~ etc . Thus 
(29) Will they be there? 
(30) Ought we to ask them? 
(31) Seldom can they see the light. 
Third, nodals can only occur initially in a verb phrase, 
a· characteristic that is shared by no other verbs in 
English. Thus whereas 
(32) I want to begin. 
(33) I begin to want. 
(34) I ought to begin. 
are O. K., 
(35) *I begin to ought. 
(36) • I want to ought. 
are definitely out. This characteristic seems to be corre-
lated witli the total lack of selection restrictions on the 
part of E:ngliah modals, For e~e~y sentence in the language, 
it is possible to create a modal sentence by the simple process 
of putting a modal, with appropriate sense inflections, before 
the main verb. From 
(37) John is reading a book 
collies 
(38) John may be reading a book. 
From 
(39) The table is red 
we 
(40) The table may be red. 
The addition of medals in no way atfects the grammaticality, 
nor the selectional restrictions of the original sentences, 
which are taken .intact from the deep structure. Fourth, all 
modals, including such morphologically past tense forms as 
could, might 1 should, would may refer to the future and may 
co-occur ~ith future time adverbials, There is, for instance, 
no time difference in the following: 
(41) He· cay go tomorrow--Re might go tomorrow 
(42) I shall ask hir:!--I should ask him 
(43) Gan you help?--Coul.d you help? 
In indirect discourse, only past tense for~s are uaed 1 of 
course. But~, ought to, (and~'~) don't change 
even in indirect discourse, 
Fifth. sentences containing modala passivize across both 
infinitive and preceding verbals, which is not the case with 
other complement-taking verbs (with the exception of a sroall 
class of intransitive verbs;~' happen, appear, etc.) 
like~' avoid, ex-Peet, enaeavor, etc. 
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(44) John may see Mary  
is passivized across to  
(45) Mary may be seen b:i• 0onn  
and the meaning is preserved, But  
(46) ,John expectr: to see >'.ary  
and its paBsive  
(47) Mary ex:pect.s to be seen by John  
are completely different in meaning,  
?.eturning :i.ow to how R.ri~lish implec'.!en ts nodals to effect 
the idea of po:rnibility, we note that among oodals expressing 
po5:sibility of various shades, can and may are most deserv:ing 
of attention. Since could and might 1 morphologically their 
past tense for::::is, ctre chiefly used in a tentative scn.se to 
make less positive state~ents or more polite requests, and 
oemi,,ntically an, not too distinct from ~ and may I what I 
have to say below concerning the latter •irill alao be applicable 
to the former, unless other,,ise specified. 
One s•!nso of is cuncerned with ability, cf whateve~ 
type. In this sense, it is not used with future time 
adve::::bials to refer to the future; future time is indicated 
will 	be able to; could refers to past time. 
(1,8) Vihcn he is older, he can run a mi.le 
is odd, but 
(49) \'lli,m he was you.ng 1 he could run a 1:1ile 
is well-formed. 
~ also exprosses feasibility or the absence of anytt:i,1;,; 
to prevent from occurring. It is replaceable by =Y and can refer to 
the future. But ..S!!! in this sense is not replaceable by may 
in questions. (50) is not the same as (51). 
(50) Can he be hiding? 
(51) Hay he be hiding? 
The 11ast tir.ie analogue oi' feasibility can is can have, not 
could. Contrast (52) and (53) 
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(52) H~ 	 can be hiding. 
(53) H:e can have bee.n hiding ,  
where the dif!erance is only in ti.me·, fa (54-)  
(54) He could be hiding 
the i .dee o:t" feasibility is mu.ch l.ess positive. There is no 
dif!ere~c~ in time. 
In n.egativ.e sentenc·es and inter ro,gatives, can appears 
whe:re may would· be likely ·or almost certain in t he corr~spond-
ing affirmative sent,ences~ 
(55) He 	 can ' t have left: He may have left. 
(56) 	 These fi~res can• t be ri,ght: Thase figures 
may be r.ig-bt . 
(.57) Who can that be .? : That m~"! be John. 
!n. ile- ·can!t have left, th~ idea of possibility is present in 
time (it isn't possible) an,d the id.e-a of leaving i .s past (that 
he has J_eft}. W:t th ..o.a.u., ·there is a contrast between (58) and 
(59 ). 
(58) You can ' t so 
(59) You can not go (do ,that you please : you cao. 
go or you ~ot go) 
Her.e can't negates the ability (or p ermission) to act; .can not 
positively states. ability (or permission) not to act. 
May , like .£2, ·is a full predicate wor·d ·expressin~ possi-
bility-,o·f vad.ous. types~ , Most ofte·n it expresses a k i.n.d of 
possibi.lity- that. .involves uncie.rta:i,nty on t!le part of the 
s_pee.ker, ~uch as the ad'i/erb perha:!)s does. May is uaed with 
reference to both pre.sent and futurej may .have is the past time 
analogue ; m.ight is used in a tenta.~i'le possibility sense . 
May is also used to give permission; reference may be to 
.the pre.sent or fut'ure time. ~her~ is :£2. pa.at td.me analogue 
_ (why?).; rnisht i :s available onJ.y as·, again, the analogous tenta-
tive form in request-questions (might he go?.). (60) in the 
permission eenee i s ru.l.ed out .. 
(60) · ·Yo14 might go 
In interrogatives~ meqr is confined to the permission 
sense. The question corresponding to (61) will employ some 
such locution as (62). 
(61) He 	 may (possibility) go home 
(62) Is there a possibility of his going home? 
The may which recognizes uncertainty is not negated. In (63) 
(63) You may not like it 
there is no negating of may--what is negated is the following 
infinith·e, ~· Permissive may ca.n be negated, as in (64). · 
(64) Cars may not park here, 
The two senses o:f m~y: arid the different scopes of !::il i.nte:r-
sect to yield logically four possible interpretations to a 
si~ple sentence like (65), 
(65) Re may not read that, 
It is, however, only two-way runbiguous between (66) and (67) 
(66) Re 	 is not allowed to read that 
(67} It is possible that he'll not read that. 
Where defective rna;:r seems inadequate for the purpose at hand, 
other locutions ca.n come to the rescul!!': there is a chance, it 
is possible, it is permitted, it is allowed, etc. 
Sentences containing stative verbs or adjectivals like 
(68) · 
(68) John may (permission) .be tall 
may seem to be odd. Under different circumstances, it would 
be perfectly natural. The sentence 
(69) They agreed· that in the play John might be 
tall but Mary had to be short. 
is impeccable. Similarly, sentences containing non-human 
subject and adjectivals like (70) 
( 70) .The answers may (permission) be correct. 
rnay be rejected at first glance. Embedding it to another 
~entence, we obtain a well-formed sentence, 
(71) 	 It would be incredible for a teacher to tell 
students that the answers may be correct 
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or may be wrong.3 
3since it may be the semantic content of a sentence 
embedded at n th depth or conjoined at nth branching which 
deter~ines the ultimate acceptability of the entire compl~x 
sentence, it poses a serious problem to current theory of 
selec;tional :restrictions which appears to have no way of 
handlir.g selectional restriction~ across sentence boundaries. 
~ is used in 3nglish to indicate a conclusion or a 
high degree of certainty. Must have is the .Past time analogue 
and can't its negation: 
(72) There must be a hundred people here. 
(73) There must. have been a hundred people here. 
(74) There can 1 t be a hundred people here. 
Unlike ma:ir, ~ is neVEl!' negated. When E..2! follows must, and 
even when it's merged with must in musn't, what is negated is 
th.e following infiniti.ve, not must itself. A sentence like (75) 
(75) John must not know the answer. 
is consequently only twoMways ambiguous: 
(76) 	 It must be the case that john does not know 
the anawer 
(77) 	 It is necessary that John does not know the 
answer. 
The conclusive ~ is not used in int,errogatives so that, 
for 0xample, the tag for (78) is often (79).• 
(78) You must be out of your mind 
(79.) Aren't you? 
Similarly, (80) is ill-f<:lrmed. 
(80) *Must you be out of your mind? 
Will is of course treated in traditional grammar as above 
anything else the marke.r of future tense, along with $hall. 
?•1o:re commonly, ~ suggests willingness or agreement. ·!t is 
formally diatingui5hed from the future will in that in this 
sense will canoccur in conditional clauses: 
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(81) 	 If he 111 come tomorrow, the matter wi11 soon 
be settled. 
Analogous to ruay and ~ 1 a similar ambigu.ity obtains for 
!!!!!1 most commonly in negation. 
(82) John will not confess his crime 
i.s ambiguous: 
(83) 	 rt will no.t happen that John will confess his 
crime 
(8l~) John refuses (will not agree) to confess his 
crime, 
Again, the ambiguity can also be sought in differences in 
the scope of the particle~· In (83) it is the infinitive 
confess, 	and in (84) -the !llodal itself that is being denied. 
Of· the medals that express the 'idea of necessitj" or 
obligation<= moral necessity) in va:rious degreest we can 
recogni.ze ~ and ought to (should). 
~ expresses a degree of constraint that ie felt as too 
strong to :permit escape--necessity 1 in other words. In this 
sense, it may refer to th.e future; its analogous past time is 
had to and its negation needn't (or don't have to): 
(85) I must go now. 
(86) I had ta go then. 
(87) I needn't go now. 
Analogous to permissive ma4 , the conclusive must is not 
interrogated. The question corresponding to (88) would be 
something like (89). 
(88) Ee 	must be an engineer 
(89) Are you sure he is an engineer? 
Also parallel to may is the fact that sentences containing~ 
can be shown to be systematically ambiguous; those that are 
not readily apparent are in fact so under different circumstances. 
Should and ouKht., no lonser felt as inflected forms of 
shall and~' are 110w used to express a degree of constraint 
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that is felt as escapable, as pointed out earlier. Their past 
time analogies are should have and ought to have;" their 
negations are shouldn't and needn't _respectively. Contrast 
should and the colloquial have to. 
(90) I have to study tonight. 
(90) implies that no escape !'rom the task is in sight. Escape 
may later be found, but this is another matter. (91) implies 
that escape from the task is quite possible. 
(91) I should study tonight. 
(92) implies that no escape was found and (9:}} implies that  
escape was actually found.  
( 92) I had ~o study last night. 
(93) I should have studied last night~ 
Ought has a much narrower range of meaning than should and 
it always leavee open the :poesibility of non-action, while~ 
does not. We may thus attest: 
(94) He ought to go, but he won•t. 
(95) •lie must 50, b~t he won't. 
Like 111usn 1t, oughtn't is the negative f'orm of ought only 
morphologically. Logical negation of both~ (obligation) 
and ought is needn't •. Compa.re (96)-(99), 
(96) I mue;t go, but John needn't. 
{97) Must I go? No, you needn't. 
(.98) I ought to go, but John needn't. 
(99) Ought I to go? Mo, you needn•t. 
Semantically, mustn't and oughtn't do not negate the obliga-
tion to act, but express a positive obligation. not to act. ~Ve 
·.may thus contrast (l.00)-(102) and (.103 )-(105). 
(100) You must go. 
(101) You needn't go. 
(102) You mustn't go,  
(l03.) You ought to go.  
(104) You needn't go' 
(105) You ought not to go. 
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This distinction can I t be made with all other modah; we 
can't with .!!!!!1 f9r instanc·e, differentiate behreen denying 
the futurity of acting and stating the futurity o! non-acting. 
Ee to expresses a kind of constraint that grows out of 
arrangement, stipulation and ex9ectation of various kinds. 
It is often a polite substitute. for th.e more direct have to o:::-
tb.e more brutal ~· 
In summary, we can observe that in contrast with non-modal 
ve:rbs in which past tense for.me and th.oae that are used in 
indirect discourse are not distinct, Eb.glish medals have the 
complication that not all the. past tense forms are used simply 
to refer to past time. The past time analogies vary for one 
simple modal in its various meanings and are certainly not 
always the past tense forms. A further co~plication i5 that 
not all modals have ~ast tense forms, chiefly because they 
refer to future time or express logical necessity. In 
con5ideril:l.g what the past time analogies are for each modal, 
we note three posa,ibilitiea: 
.(a) past time reference ;i..s made with all of the. mods.ls in 
one of their senses with E.!.!!., e.g., 
(106) He can have been at home yesterday. (possibility) 
(107} He may have come last week. (possibility) 
(108) They must have done it then. (certainty) 
(109) 	 You ought to have come with us 
yesterday. (desirability) 
(b) for 5ome of the senses, the past time analogue seems 
to be past tense plus~: 
(110) He would have done that for :you. (volition) 
(111) Ile could llave gone. (permission) 
(112) I could have done that if you had 
asked. (willingness) 
But these forms are generally referring to events that failed 
to happen. 
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(c) ~ has entirely different verbs as past ti~e analogies: 
(113) John ,!!E.:!! go (now). 
{ll4) John had to go then. 
(115} John must have gone. 
3. This section will be devoted to the problem of how modals 
are to be introduced and represented in the deep structure and 
to a discussion of the syntactic properties of rnodals in general 
terms. Hy point of de:9arture will be Ross 1 s paper, "Auxiliaries 
aa main verbs, n where he first argues that all Aux' s be~png to 
the same major category as true verbs aod are to be introduced 
into the deep structure the same way other verbs are and that 
there is ~o Aux constituent in the deep structure. I assume 
in the absence of countarar~uments that Ross•s arguments are 
conclusively established. In the following, although I will 
be basing my discussion largely on the evidence from the 
ttneut.ra1 11 modal !ll.ay, it will be easy to extrapolate and extend 
my argttments, if valid, to be generally applicable to all 
modals. ·:rhe arguments presented bel()W for the aubj eet-embedding 
may, for instance, apply to the conclusive must and those for 
the may which takes a sentential complement also seem to 
apply to the neces6ity ~· 
We begin by observing that permissi •.re mav, when used as 
a performative, may be a true verb which has a first person 
subject, as in (116), 
(116) John may read the book. 
or unspecified subject as in (117). 
(117) Cars may not park in'this lot. 
The 	 deep Gtructure of (116) would roughly be something like 
4the following: 
- 174 -
-------(ll8) s NP VP 
I -----~ 1 V S 
I 
allow John reads the book 
4 r leave open the question whether the deep structure in 
(118) is in fact the correct one or (1.16 ') is actually an 
instance of NP complementation. It inay be noted , however, 
that (116) may well be an instance of VP cor.rolementation since 
the pseudo - cleft sentence is impossible: 
·"'i'ihat I allow John is that Joh:n .reads the book. 
or 
• 
1,Vha.t John may is to r e ad the book. 
Lexical substitution rule(s) wil l consult the DS , substitute 
mav for the portion ·of tree dominating I allow (the details 
of which are not known to me); The .Flip t;rnnsfo;rrnation th.en 
applies obligatorily to produce the correct surface for::i of 
(116). 
An alternative, but much less plausible DS for (116) 





Jann V NP 
I~ 
may it S...-------
c: ----»John reads the book 
and Equi-NP deletion applies to the complement sentence to 
produce the corr ect surface form. ADS li~e this , be i ng 
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bound up too much with the surface representation, seems to be 
wrong on two counts: (1) it assigns falsely a transitive 
reading to ma:,; and (2) it fails to capture the fact that 
underlyille:ly may is a :;i er for:native verb. 
Note the swiich of agents froro active to passive sentences 
i::ivolving cay (and modals in g·ene·ral)!_while in (120) the agent 
is the speaker, its active counterpart (121) implies that the 
agent is anything but the speaker. 
(120) ·John reay be examined by me. 
(121) I may examine ,John. 
Below are a class of simple may-sentences containing alJ. 
three persons. On the right is exhibited the switch of persons 
invol•.red. Matrix agent is- the person giving the permission and 
constituent agent is equivalent to the embedding subject, 
Matrix Constituent 
Afient A.5:ent 
(122) I may examine John. Re I 
(123) ·rJohn may be examined by me. I I 
(124) You may examine John. I you 
(125) John may be examined by you. I you 
(126) Mary may examine John. I l·fary 
(127) John may be exa!!lined by Mary. I Nary 
(128) I may e.'l'amine you, He I 
(129) ?You may be examined by me. ! I 
(130) !ou may examine me. I you 
(131) I may be examined by you. I you 
(132) John may examine me. I John 
(133) I :nay be examined by John. I John 
One thing that emerges clearly from the above comparison is 
that the second :person~ can never appear a.s matrix agent. 
Also the whole ran.ge of sentences containing all poeeible 
combinations of persons show that there is a constraint in 
English to the effect that no matrix agent can be identical to 
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a constituent agent. These sentences are marked with a 
question mark above, 
May in the possibility sense .might be an intransitive 
V·erb like ~, an-near, happen, etc., so that the DS of (134) 
would be something like (13:,,) 1 
(134-) John 	may read the book, 
s 
NP 	 VP 
~ 	 I 
it s~ may 
NP VP 
I /""-
John 	 y NP 
·, ~
reads the 	 book 
with the subject NP ~ being substi t u.ted for J.:! by l,!-
r eplace:nent and the re5t of the er.ibedded sentence 'being moved 
~o the right and brol)ght under the domination oi tho ma·trix 
·vp yielding 	the. correct surface form o! (134) . 
I.t has been n.ot.ed that the possibility may is never 
ne&ated. A se'Atence like (136) is paraphrasable ~ith (137) 
but not with (138). 
(136) John 	may not read the book. 
(137) 	 It is possible that John will not read the 
book. 
(138) It is not possible that John. will read the 
book. 
This characteristic of· allowing oniy unidirectional ne·gation 
is not to be found in verbs like·~' happen~ appear, since 
(139) has the paraphrase (140) or ( 141). 
(139) John 	seems not to be reading the book. 
(140) It seems that John is not reading the book. 
(141) 	 It does not 6eem that John is reading the 
book. 
. There may be no explanati,on fo:r the fact that only the embedded 
VP can be negated~ given a D.S like (135). Other seemingly 
unexplainable facts with regard to the possibility may: are 
(142) ~nd (143). 
(142) it is never interrogated 
(143) it is hardly passivized. 
A DS like {135) in which it appears might ·be objected to  
on the ground that g is not a meaning.;.bearing element. Note,  
however, the presence of l! may ba available to account for  
serttences like (144) in a simpler way,  
(144) 	 It may be (the case) that John will read 
the oo ok. 
Hay, like ~' etc., does not permit the aentential  
subject to be moved to the front and topicalized, indicating  
that the extraposition transformation is obligatory for this  
class of -.rerbs.  
· {may }
{145) *That John will read the book seem , appear 
happen 
If the matrix VP node is further expanded, we get the gram:nati-
cal sentence (144) to (146). 
(146) It may be strange that John will read the 
book. 
Sentences (144) and (146) can be pseudo-clefted since the NP 
subject contains a sentence (14?). 
(l47) 	 What may be the case is that John will read 
th.e book. 
and (148) 
(1!~8) What may be strange is that John will read 
the book. 
Consider now a pair of :related sentences like (149) and 
(150). 
(149) The 	noise may annoy John. 
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(150) John may be an.noyed by the noise. 
This pair of sentences are synonymous. If their Ds is something 
like {151), 
(151) 	 s 
NP 	 VP 
~ I 
it S may 
the noise annoys John 
it can account for the synonymy of (152) and (153) (and hence 
(149 ) and (150)). Since the only differ~nce between (149) 
and (150) is that the passive transformation has applied in 
the embedded sentence of (150) but no t in (149) . 
(152) It may be that the noise will, annoy John. 
(153) 	 It may be that John will be annoyed by the 
noise . 
If , on therother hand, ma_y is a ver~ like. condesc en:d , 
taking a. sentential complement or a transitive verb like want 
taking a sentential o_bj ect. we would expect (14-9) to exhibit 
5ome difference in meaning since the deep subject of (149) 
would be noi se; that of (150) would be ~. 
This concludes my discussion of tho syntax of the English 
modals . There are sev,eral problems I •·ve not addressed myself 
to . I've not . committed myself to an expl anati,on. for instance , 
of why the yermiss·ive ma,r is greatly weakened under the passive 
transformation, :i:f it iB possible at all. One may explain this 
by saying that the' passive takes place in the , c omplement sentence 
of the modal. In the case of possibility may, which has a DS 
like (118) , the new subject is simply r aise d to giv ~ the passive 
surface form. The permissive may must, ho11,ever, undergo 
lexical substitution rules and the Flip transformation. Since 
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the idea of permission is difficult to associate with the 
object of the embedded sentence, the pa$sive sentence, thus 
produced, is strange in this reading. 
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